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## THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE.

Translated from the German of G. W. F. HEGEL.

[What we had occasion to remark at the beginning of our translation of the exposition of Plato—taken from Hegel's History of Philosophy (Jour. Spec. Phil., Vol. IV., p. 225)—is especially fitting as an introduction here. In Aristotle one finds a mind so vast that two thousand years have scarcely done more than confirm his statements. Aristotle seems to have laid down the principles, pointed out the methods, and to a great extent made the terminology or *technique* of the various sciences, so that no one can talk or write science without using Aristotelian forms. The absurd notion which has gained currency in modern times, that Aristotle used Deduction while Bacon uses Induction, will be dispelled (it is hoped) by this article. The true method is certainly no one-sided one, but an organic union of deduction and induction such as is involved in the activity of Recognition.]

This treatise is divided into five parts: I. General Introduction, containing an account of the Life and Writings of Aristotle. II. The *Metaphysics*. III. Philosophy of Nature. IV. Philosophy of Spirit, subdivided into (a) Psychology; (b) Practical Philosophy, including (1) Ethics, (2) Politics. V. Logic.

The translation will be published complete in this volume.—EDITOR.]

## I.—INTRODUCTION.

Although one is reluctant to leave the consideration of Plato, yet in taking up Aristotle, his pupil, the danger of extending one's remarks to an immoderate length is still greater. For Aristotle is one of the richest and deepest scientific geniuses that ever lived: a man without equal in ancient or modern times. By reason of the wide compass embraced by those of his works that have come down to us, the material before us is so extensive that we shall scarcely be able to treat it with that completeness which it deserves. We will, therefore, limit ourselves to a general view of his Philosophy, and descend into particulars only in those places where Aristotle has carried out more fully what the Platonic Principle began,—not merely in the depth of the ideas, but also in their further application; [and these places will occur frequently] for Aristotle is comprehensive and speculative to a degree attained by no other thinker, although he does not proceed systematically [i. e. by dialectical evolution].

*The general character of his Philosophy.*

To characterize in brief his labors, one would say: he has travelled over the whole range of human knowledge, has

pushed his investigations on all sides into the real universe, and has brought into subjection to IDEAS the wealth and untamed luxuriance of the realms of nature. Almost all of the philosophical sciences have to thank him for their definition and commencement. Notwithstanding science—in the shape he gave it—falls apart into a series of abstract conceptions, yet there are to be found in the Aristotelian philosophy the deepest speculative ideas. In the same manner that he dealt with particular provinces, he dealt also with the whole. A general view of his Philosophy presents no totality which is self-systematized, and whose order and connection belong to the same idea; on the contrary, the parts are picked up empirically and placed side by side; so that each part is treated by itself without being subordinated through a scientific treatment that shows up its relations and connections. An exposition of this necessity [by which the whole determines the parts] cannot be expected from the standpoint Philosophy assumed in that time. But although Aristotle's system does not present itself in its parts as a development from its idea, seeming rather to consist of coördinate members [i. e. not subordinate to one principle], yet they form one totality, and that an essentially speculative philosophy.

One reason why we should deal with Aristotle more in detail lies in the fact that no philosopher has had more injustice done him through utterly thoughtless traditions which have gained currency regarding his system, and still are repeated, notwithstanding he was for long centuries the teacher of all philosophical thinkers: these traditions ascribe to him views which are totally opposite to those found in his philosophy. And while Plato has had the good fortune to be much read, the treasure that Aristotle bequeathed to us has remained for centuries as good as unknown, and the most erroneous prejudices have prevailed regarding it. His speculative, logical works are known to scarcely any one. To his views in natural history more justice is done in modern times, but not to his philosophical views.

To particularize: there is an opinion widely held that the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophies are opposed to each other in the sense that the latter is idealism, and the former realism—realism in the most trivial meaning of that term.

Plato, according to this view, set up the Ideal for his principle, holding that the Idea from its internal power created its determinations; Aristotle, on the contrary, is supposed to have held that the soul is a *tabula rasa*, receiving passively all its determinations from the external world; his philosophy would thus be empiricism, "the lowest form of Lockeanism," &c. How little this is the case we shall see in the sequel. In truth, Aristotle surpasses even Plato in speculative depth; inasmuch as he has arrived at the most fundamental speculative insights—at Idealism—and standing on these, has explained, by their application, the widest empirical fields of investigation.

Among the French, too, there still exist quite false views regarding Aristotle. An example of what tradition attributes to him, without ever once looking into his works to verify its dicta, is that doctrine, so highly prized in the old *Æsthetics*, of the three unities of the Drama—those of Action, of Time, and of Place—and called "*règles d' Aristote, la saine doctrine.*" Aristotle, however (Poet. ch. 8 & 5, Becker's ed.), speaks only of the unity of action, and incidentally mentions that of time; of the third unity, that of place, he says nothing at all.

#### *His Life.*

He was born at Stagira, a Thracian city on the Strymonic gulf, but a Greek colony: hence, though born in Thrace, he was a Grecian. In the meantime this Greek colony fell, with the rest of Greece, under the dominion of Philip of Macedon. Aristotle's birth was in the first year of the 99th Olympiad (384 B.C.); and if Plato was born in the third year of the 87th Olympiad (430 B.C.) it follows that Aristotle was forty-six years younger. His father Nicomachus was physician to the Macedonian king Amyntas, the father of Philip. After the death of his parents, whom he lost at an early age, Aristotle was brought up by a certain Proxenus, whom he requited with continual gratitude, and held his memory so dear that he erected a statue to him. He also made returns for his own education by instructing Nicanor, the son of his benefactor, and adopting him as his heir. In the seventeenth year of his age, Aristotle came to Athens and passed twenty years in the society of Plato. Thus he enjoyed the best opportu-

nities for learning the Platonic Philosophy thoroughly; and the assertion sometimes made that he did not understand Plato would seem, as far as external grounds appear, to be an arbitrary, quite unfounded assumption.

As regards the relation of Plato to Aristotle, especially the circumstance that Plato chose, not Aristotle for his successor in the Academy, but Speusippus, a near relative, there are a number of useless, self-contradictory anecdotes preserved by Diogenes Laertius. If the continuation of the Platonic school meant the narrow, strict adherence to philosophy in Plato's sense of the term, of course Plato could not appoint Aristotle as his successor; but Speusippus was just the man for the place. Nevertheless Plato's true successor was Aristotle; for Aristotle expounded philosophy in Plato's meaning, but deeper and more comprehensively, so that philosophy made progress at his hands. His indignation at this slight is alleged as the cause why Aristotle left Athens after the death of Plato and went to live with Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneus in Mysia, who had been his fellow-pupil under Plato and afterwards had developed a close friendship for Aristotle. Hermias, an independent prince, among other absolute Greek princes and republics in Asia Minor, was subjugated by a Persian satrap; Hermias was taken and sent a prisoner to Artaxerxes in Persia, who crucified him forthwith. In order to escape a similar fate, Aristotle fled with his wife Pythias, the daughter of Hermias, to Mitylene and resided there for some time. He erected a statue at Delphi in honor of Hermias, with an inscription that has come down to us; from this it appears that Hermias was betrayed into the hands of the Persians through artifice. Aristotle celebrated his name in a beautiful hymn to Virtue, that is still extant.

From Mitylene, in the second year of the 109th Olympiad (343 B.C.), he was called by Philip of Macedon to take charge of the education of his son Alexander, then fifteen years of age. Philip had already invited him in that well-known letter in which he announced the birth of his son: "Be it known to you that a son is born to me; but I thank the gods not so much that they have given me him, as that they have allowed him to be born in your time. For I hope that your care and insight will make him worthy of me and of his future king-

dom." It has the appearance in history of a brilliant career, to have been the educator of an Alexander. Aristotle enjoyed also at this court the favor and respect of Philip and Olympias in the highest degree. What became of Aristotle's pupil is well known; and the greatness of Alexander's mind and deeds, and his enduring friendship for Aristotle, are the highest testimony of the spirit and efficiency of that education, if Aristotle needed any such testimony. The culture of Alexander is a sufficient reply to all the prating about the practical uselessness of speculative philosophy. Aristotle found in Alexander another and a worthier pupil than Plato had found in Dionysius. Plato was occupied with a Republic, with the ideal of a State. With this subject before his mind he sought to find means for its realization; the individual was for him only the means, and hence indifferent in other respects. With Aristotle, on the other hand, no such purpose was in view; he confined himself strictly to the individual before him: and his aim was to develop and expand the individuality. Aristotle is known as a deep, fundamental, metaphysician, and that he labored earnestly with Alexander is evident from the result. That he did not pursue the modern superficial course with the education of princes is clear partly from the earnest character of Aristotle, who knew well what is true generally, and hence what is true in culture and how to develop it; the other evidence of this is found in the external circumstance that Alexander, when he heard, in the midst of his expedition for the conquest of Asia, that Aristotle had published his acroamatic doctrines in his speculative (metaphysical) writings, wrote to him reproving him for it, and saying that he ought not to communicate to the common folk what they two had studied together; upon which Aristotle replied that the doctrines remained as much a secret after being communicated as before.

It is not the place here to form an estimate of Alexander as a historical person. That in Alexander's education which should be ascribed to Aristotle's philosophical instruction is the elevation of the natural, peculiar greatness of his inborn talents to internal freedom, and to perfect self-conscious independence such as we see in his plans and deeds. Alexander attained that perfect self-possession that alone gives infinite

keenness of thought, and that independence of particular, limited plans, as well as their elevation to perfectly universal aims involving the reduction of the world to a common social life and intercourse, through the establishment of states in which individual caprice was to be removed. Alexander carried out the plan which his father had already formed, namely, to lead Greece against Asia, and to avenge Europe by subjugating Asia and making it tributary to Greece. Thus as the Greeks enter history at the beginning united in the Trojan war, they are also united again only at the close of the history of Greece proper. Alexander revenged at the same time the faithlessness and cruelty that the Persians had shown towards Hermias, the friend of Aristotle. But more especially Alexander extended Greek culture over Asia with the purpose of elevating that wild, merely destructive, self-sundering mass of barbarism—that land sunk in complete negligence and spiritual degradation—of elevating this into a Greek world. And when it is said that he was only a conqueror, and that he knew not how to found a permanent state, his kingdom being divided after his death, this is correct if considered in a superficial manner—namely, his family did not retain possession of this dominion; but the rule of Greece was permanent. Alexander founded a wide kingdom not for his own family, but for the Grecian people; for after his time Greek culture and science became indigenous there. The Greek kingdoms of Asia Minor and of Egypt were for centuries the seats of science; and their effects may have extended as far as India and China. We do not know precisely whether the Indians did not obtain the best of their sciences in this way; but it is probable that the more definite parts of their astronomy came to India from Greece. The Syrian monarchy, which stretched far eastward into Asia to a Greek kingdom in Bactria, is doubtless (in its Greek colonies which settled there) the source from which China obtained the few scraps of scientific information possessed there, and which have been handed down by tradition, but have not accumulated interest. For the Chinese are so inexpert as not to be able to make a calendar, and they seem to lack the very idea of such a thing. They have preserved old instruments which serve them no purpose, and the most

probable conjecture is that they came from Bactria. The high opinions formed of the sciences of the Chinese and Indians are without foundation.

According to Ritter, (*Erdkunde*, vol. ii., p. 839, 1st ed.) Alexander was impelled not merely with the idea of conquering, but with that of becoming himself the ruler. I am not of the opinion that Aristotle impressed upon his pupil this idea, nor that other [idea of being deified] connected with the Oriental mode of view. In the Orient still flourishes the name of Alexander as Ispander, and also as Dul-k-ar-nein, i. e. the man with two horns; as also Jupiter Ammon is an image of a more ancient hero. It may be a question whether the Macedonian kings did not lay claim to the dominion over that country on account of their pretended descent from the races of heroes of Old India. Whence also the expedition of Dionysius from Thrace to India could be explained; whether the "knowledge of this was not the real religious conviction which at bottom inspired the soul of the young hero, inasmuch as he, before his expedition into Asia, found Indian hierarchies on the lower Danube (in which the immortality of the soul was taught); and began his expedition to the Orient certainly with the advice of Aristotle, who was initiated into the wisdom of the Indians through Plato and Pythagoras; and he first visited the oracle of Ammon (now Siva), and then destroyed the Persian monarchy and burned Persepolis, which was the ancient foe of the Indian theology, in order to take vengeance for all the impiety committed by Darius on the Buddhists and their followers." This is an ingenious combination based on a thorough study of the connection of Oriental and European ideas as well as of the higher points of view in the treatment of history. But this conjecture is a different one from the historical view which I have embraced; Alexander's expedition has a quite other historical, military and political character than the one mentioned; and besides this, it has but little to do with the Indians: it is a conquering expedition in downright earnest. Aristotle's metaphysics and philosophy is, in the second place, quite free from any recognition of such crazy, sentimental fancies. The later elevation of Alexander to the rank of a general, hero, and god, by the Oriental phantasie is, in the third place, nothing strange or



wonderful; the Dalai-Lama is still an example of the same thing, and God and Man are not so widely separated after all. Besides, Greece inclined to the adoption of the idea of a god who had become a man, and not as a statue, cold and distant, but a present god in the godless world.: as in fact Demetrius Phalerius and others were honored and celebrated in Athens soon after this as gods. Moreover, had not the Infinite at this period entered into the self-consciousness? Fourthly, the Buddhists do not concern Alexander at all, and in his Indian expedition nothing is said of them; the destruction of Persepolis is sufficiently accounted for as an act of Greek retaliation for the temples that Xerxes had destroyed in Athens.

While Alexander was performing this great work — the greatest individual at the head of Grecian nationality — he never forgot the interests of art and science. We, in modern times, have seen warriors mindful of science and art in their campaigns; so Alexander caused preparations to be made for sending to Aristotle whatever new animals or plants were found in Asia, either the specimens themselves or else drawings and descriptions of them. This respect paid by Alexander to Aristotle furnished the latter the fairest opportunity to collect materials for the knowledge of Nature. Pliny (*Hist. nat.* viii. 17 ed. Bip.) relates that Alexander commissioned some thousands of men, who lived by hunting, fishing, and bird catching, as overseers of the parks, aviaries and fish-ponds of the Persian kingdom, and instructed them to furnish Aristotle everything worthy of note from all places. The effect of Alexander's expedition into Asia upon Aristotle's labors was such as to place him in a position to become the father of Natural History; and Pliny tells us that a work on Natural History was composed by him in fifty parts.

After Alexander entered on his expedition to Asia, Aristotle returned to Athens and appeared as a public teacher in the Lyceum, an enclosure which Pericles had used for a place to drill his recruits. It consisted of a temple dedicated to the Lycian Apollo, and walks ornamented by trees, fountains, and colonnades. From these walks, his school received the name of "Peripatetic," and not, as sometimes reported, from Aristotle's walking about while he delivered his lectures.

He lived as teacher in this way thirteen years in Athens. On the death of Alexander, there burst forth a storm which, as it seems, had been for a long time restrained through fear of Alexander; Aristotle was accused of impiety. The details are differently given. Among other things, it is related that his crime was found in his hymn to Hermias and the inscription on the statue dedicated to him. As he saw the storm approaching he fled to Chalcis in Eubœa, the present Negropont, in order, as he said, not to give the Athenians an opportunity to sin against Philosophy again. At that place he died in his sixty-third year—Olympiad 114, 3 (322 B.C.)

*His Writings.*

The sources for his philosophy are his writings; but if we consider their external fate and their external character, the difficulty of making out his philosophy from them will seem to be very great. I cannot enter much into details on this point. Diogenes Laertius (v. 21–27) mentions a very great number of them by their titles; however, we cannot tell exactly which of the ones he names are still extant, for his titles are quite different from those we use. Diogenes gives 445,270 as the number of lines; if we reckon about ten thousand lines to an alphabet [or complete work; Homer's *Iliad* contains twenty-four books, a complete alphabet], there would be forty-four alphabets; what we still possess amounts to about ten alphabets, so that we have about a fourth part of his works. The fate of the Aristotelian manuscripts is so reported as to leave us in doubt as to whether we may possibly hope to possess a single one of his writings in a genuine and uninjured shape. Doubts regarding their authenticity could not under these circumstances be prevented; and we must rather express surprise that they have come to us in as complete a shape as they have. Aristotle wrote, as is related, manuscripts little known during his lifetime, and left them to his successor Theophrastus, with the rest of his numerous library. This is, indeed, the first important library; it arose through his own wealth and the assistance of Alexander; and by it is explained the erudition of Aristotle. Later, it came, partly at least, or copies of it, to Alexandria, and formed the nucleus of the Ptolemaic library, which became a prey to the flames

on the entrance of Julius Cæsar into Alexandria. Of the manuscripts of Aristotle, however, it is related that Theophrastus bequeathed them to a certain Neleus, from whom they passed into the hands of ignorant persons who took no pains in preserving them; or, as others state it, the heirs of Neleus, in order to save them from the king of Pergamus, who was very zealous in collecting a library, buried them in a cellar, where they lay forgotten a hundred and thirty years and thus became sadly damaged. Finally, the followers of Theophrastus discovered them again after much research, and sold them to one Apellicon of Teios, who again restored what had been destroyed by worms and rot. But for this labor he did not possess the requisite learning and skill: wherefore others have applied themselves and filled out the gaps according to their best judgment and have restored the destroyed portions, so that they by this means have been much changed. But this was not all. Soon after Apellicon's death the Roman Sylla conquered Athens, and among the spoils which he sent to Rome were the writings of Aristotle. The Romans, who had but just begun to make the acquaintance of Greek science and art, and not yet rightly to prize Greek Philosophy, were not able to extract anything of value from this booty. A Greek, Tyrannio by name, obtained permission to use the manuscripts of Aristotle and to bring them to notice, and he prepared an edition of them, which, however, bears the reproach of being inaccurate; for here they had the fate of being placed by the booksellers in the hands of ignorant copyists, who allowed a multitude of corruptions to creep into the text.

Such the sources of the Aristotelian Philosophy are described to be. Aristotle, in his lifetime, published much—namely, his manuscripts in the Alexandrian library; nevertheless, these works do not seem to have circulated much. Several of them are in the highest degree corrupt, full of omissions and (the Poetics, for example) incomplete. Several (e.g. the Metaphysical writings) seem to be made up in part from several different works; so that the higher species of criticism has here a field for the exercise of all its acumen, and while with much show of probability one theory is presented and defended, on the other side another view is

defended with equal force. So much is certain, that the writings of Aristotle have been injured, and are disconnected in individual parts and in important particulars; often, verbal repetitions of entire passages occur. Since the evil is so old there is no radical cure to be expected for it; meanwhile the case is not quite so bad as it looks from such descriptions. There are many of his chief works which may pass for entire and uninjured; and others there are which are only here and there injured, or else not well arranged, but the body of the works not so much affected as it might seem. What we have is sufficient to place us in a position to form a definite idea of the Aristotelian Philosophy, both in its extent and compass, and also in much of its details.

But there is still a historical distinction to be drawn. It is an old tradition that Aristotle delivered two kinds of lectures and wrote two sorts of works: *esoteric* (or *acroamatic*) and *exoteric*;—a distinction which is also made by the Pythagoreans. The esoteric discourses he is said to have held in the Lyceum during the morning hours, the exoteric in the evening; the latter are said to have consisted in the exercise of rhetoric and disputation, and to have had reference to fitting for civil employments; the former, however, to have concerned the inner and deeper philosophy, the consideration of Nature, and the dialectic proper. This circumstance is of no importance; one may see for himself which works are really speculative and philosophic, and which ones are to a greater extent of a merely empirical nature; they are not for this reason, however, to be looked upon as opposite in content, as though Aristotle wrote some things for the people and other things for his intimate disciples.

*What is included under the name Aristotelian.*

a. In the first place, it is to be remarked, that the name "Aristotelian Philosophy" is very vague, since what one calls by that name has had in different times very different shapes. First, it denotes the real Aristotelian Philosophy. Secondly, in the time of Cicero, particularly under the name of Peripatetic, it had assumed the form of a popular philosophy dealing chiefly with natural history and morals; this period seems to have had no interest in cultivating the deep and

really speculative side of the Aristotelian Philosophy and in gaining an insight into it. Hence in Cicero we find no trace of this side. A third form of the same is the Alexandrian Philosophy, speculative in the highest degree; its writers are usually known as New-Pythagoreans or Neo-Platonists, but they have as good a title to the name New-Aristotelians. The form which they use, and which is considered to be identical with the Platonic, is rather Aristotelian. Another important sense of the Aristotelian Philosophy may be named as the fourth one; that in which it is identified, by not over-exact scholars, with the Scholastic Philosophy of the middle ages. The scholastics busied themselves a great deal with Aristotle; but the shape which his philosophy assumed under their hands we cannot hold to be its genuine form. None of the amplifications nor the entire extent of the formal Metaphysic [*“Verstandes-Metaphysik”*] and logic which we find in scholasticism belong to Aristotle. The Scholastic Philosophy proceeds only from the traditions of Aristotelian teachings. And first, when the writings of Aristotle became known in the west—namely, at the time of the decay of scholasticism and the revival of learning—a *fifth* form of his philosophy took its rise, and in part as opposed to scholasticism; for only after the Reformation were the sources sought in Aristotle himself. The *sixth* sense of the expression Aristotelian Philosophy includes the recent distorted ideas and interpretations such as, for example, one finds in Tennemann, who is endowed with too little philosophical acumen to be able to seize the Philosophy of Aristotle. At all events, his is the common idea which now prevails regarding the Aristotelian Philosophy, to wit: that it sets up for its highest scientific principle what is called *Experience*.

*His Style of Exposition.*

b. Although to identify Aristotle's method with empiricism is to form a false idea of it, yet the occasion for such a mistake exists in his style of exposition. Some particular passages are selected for this purpose, and are taken in their isolated meaning in order to prove this view. We have, therefore, to speak here of the Aristotelian style. Since, as before remarked, we are not to seek in Aristotle a System of Philos-

ophy whose parts can be strictly deduced,—since he seems rather to take an external beginning and an empirical procedure, his style is often that of ordinary argumentation. But Aristotle has the peculiarity in this procedure of being thoroughly and in the deepest sense speculative. His style consists, when more closely examined, in this: *first*, to bring together and seize the phenomenon as a thinking observer. He gets the sensuous phenomenon [*Anschauung*] before him in its entire completeness, and omits nothing, be it ever so common. All sides of knowing enter his mind, all interest him; all are handled by him with depth and exhaustiveness. Abstraction may easily get confused in the empirical extent of a phenomenon, and be at a loss how to find its application and verification, and be obliged at last to take up with a partial procedure without being able to exhaust all the phases of the phenomenon. Aristotle, however, in that he takes into consideration all sides of the Universe, seizes the whole of each individual sphere, as a speculative philosopher, and treats it in such a manner as to arrive at the deepest speculative idea of it. We see [by degrees in his treatment] thoughts first emerge from the Sensuous phase and pass over into the sophistry of that stage of thinking which deals with the Phenomenon. In perception, in conception, the categories make their appearance; the absolute essence, the speculative view of these moments is always expressed in the utterance of perception. This pure essence of perception is seized upon by Aristotle. *Secondly*, when he, on the other hand, begins with the universal, the simple, and passes over to its definition, he has the appearance of one who counts up the various senses in which the subject is employed; and in these various senses he goes through all the species, even the common and sensuous ones. He speaks in this manner, e. g. of the different significations in which the words *οὐσία*, *ἀρχή*, *αἰτία*, *ἰσχύς*, &c., are used. It is sometimes tiresome to follow him in this mere enumeration, which proceeds without [inherent] necessity, and in which the series of meanings seem to be collected in an external manner, and to be akin only in a vague or abstract sense and not according to their determinatenesses. But this mode of procedure presents the moments in their completeness, and, moreover, it stimulates

one to finding for himself the necessity [that dwells in them]. *Thirdly*, Aristotle brings up the various thoughts which the earlier philosophers held, and refutes them, often in an empirical way, correcting their onesidedness with manifold reasons and arguments. After this he comes to the true speculative definition : *fourthly* and finally, Aristotle passes to the speculative consideration of the subject itself of which he is treating, be it, for example, the soul, feeling, memory, thought, motion, time, place, heat, cold, &c. &c. Since he takes up all the moments [elements or phases] that are contained in the representation of the object, as if bound up together, he does not omit any determinateness, nor hold fast first to one and then to another, but holds them all at the same time in one : the habit of Reflection, or of the understanding, on the contrary, having the principle of identity for its rule, manages to get along only by forgetting and abstracting from all other determinations than the one with which it is immediately engaged. Aristotle, however, has the patience to investigate all views and all questions ; and from the examination of the individual determinations comes forth the firm-abiding determinateness of the object. Thus Aristotle arrives at the ideal totality [*Begriff*], and is really philosophical in the highest degree while he seems to be merely empirical. His empiricism is of a total, or entire, order, through the fact that he always brings it back to the speculative [i. e. shows the indwelling necessity of what at first seemed accidental] ; it may be said, therefore, that as a complete [exhaustive, absolute] empirical investigator, he is at the same time a speculative one. For example, if we should take up empirically *all* the determinations of space without omitting any, this would be a speculative procedure in the highest sense ; *for the empirical, comprehended in its synthesis, is the speculative Idea.*

In this faculty of bringing together determinations into one thought, Aristotle is great and masterly, as well as in the simplicity of his procedure, and in giving judgments in a few words. This is a method of philosophizing which possesses great effectiveness, and which has been employed in our time, e. g. by the French. It deserves to come into more frequent use ; for it is an excellent thing to reduce the different aspects

of ordinary views regarding objects to the unity of thought, and thus to bring them together into one necessary idea. But, of course, this method has the appearance of being empirical in one respect—namely, in this, that it takes up these objects in the order it finds them in our consciousness of them; and as there is no necessity in this procedure of taking them up, it becomes an external affair of style. Still we cannot deny that sometimes Aristotle does not aim to reduce all to unity, or at least to a unity of antithetic elements; but, on the contrary, to hold fast each one in its determinateness, and thus to preserve it. That procedure [of reduction to unity] may be sometimes a very superficial affair, e.g. when everything is brought to a single empty determinateness, like that of Irritability and Sensibility, Sthenic and Asthenic; but, on the other hand, it is also necessary to apprehend reality in its simple determinateness,—of course, without making the latter [i. e. the simple determinateness] the point of procedure in the way just mentioned. But Aristotle, on the contrary, abandons a determination only when he has traced it into another sphere wherein it retains no longer its former shape; but he shows what form it now takes, or what change it has undergone. And he often treats one determination after the other without explaining their connection. In his own speculative thinking Aristotle is as deep as Plato, and at the same time more developed and conscious; for the antitheses obtain in his treatment a higher degree of definiteness. There is lacking, indeed, the beautiful form that Plato gives to his expositions, that sweetness of language, or—one might almost say—of gossip, that tone of conversation which is at once lively, cultivated, and humane. But in those places where we find Plato endeavoring to express the speculative idea thetically, as for example in the *Timæus*, we see the defective and impure mingling with the pure thought, and the latter disappear, while, on the contrary, Aristotle under similar circumstances expresses it pure, and comprehends it. We learn the object in his definition, and the definite concept of it; moreover, Aristotle penetrates speculatively into the nature of the object, but in such a manner that it remains in its concrete determination, and Aristotle seldom reduces it to abstract categories. The study of Aristotle is consequently inexhaus-



tible ; but the exposition thereof is very difficult for the reason mentioned, i. e. that it does not reduce its content to general principles. Hence in order to present the philosophy of Aristotle, one must take up the special content of each work. If the proper earnestness in Philosophy were felt, nothing would be more worthy of undertaking than a special course of lectures on Aristotle, for he is of all the ancients the most deserving of study.

*Definition of the Aristotelian Idea.*

c. The next point should be the definition of the Aristotelian Idea ; and here is to be made a general remark to the effect that Aristotle begins with Philosophy as such, and first discourses on the *worth of Philosophy* in the second chapter of the first book of *Metaphysics* : “The subject-matter of Philosophy is the most knowable [i. e. most capable of certainty], to wit, principles and causes,” i. e. the rational. “For through these, and by these, all other things are known ; principles are, however, not to be known through substrates (*ὑποκείμενα*).” In this we see him take his stand against the ordinary mode of view. Aristotle, has, moreover, stated the chief form of investigation, or the most essential form of knowing (*ἐπιστήμη ἀρχικωτάτη*), to be the knowledge of FINAL CAUSES : and that this is the good of each thing, or in general the best in nature as a whole. This reminds one of the doctrine held by Plato and Socrates ; yet Final Cause is true and concrete, as opposed to the abstract Platonic Idea. Aristotle says in the next place, speaking of the worth of philosophy : “Man has come to philosophy through wonder” ; for in it there is at least the intimation of a knowledge of a higher. “Wherefore if men began to philosophize in order to escape ignorance, it is clear that they pursued scientific knowledge for the sake of knowing it, and not for any utility it might possess. This is also shown by the entire external course of events. For first after men have supplied their necessary wants and those requisite for ease and comfort, they have begun to seek philosophical knowledge. Therefore we seek it for no ulterior utility : and so as we say that a free man is such as exists only for his own sake and not for the sake of another, thus is Philosophy the free science among

sciences, for it alone exists for itself,—a knowing of knowing [science of knowledge]. Wherefore this is also with justice considered to be not a human acquisition”—i. e. man does not possess philosophy so much as it possesses him. “For in manifold ways the nature of man is dependent; so that, according to Simonides, God alone has this prerogative (*γέρας*), and yet that it is unworthy of man not to seek that science which is adapted to his capacity (*τῷ κατ’ αὐτὸν ἐπιστήμῳ*). If, however, the poet is right and envy belongs to the divine nature, then all who desire higher things are unfortunate”; Nemesis punishes that which elevates itself above the commonplace, and equalizes all things again. “But the divine cannot possess envy,” i. e. so as to refuse to reveal itself and thereby prevent man from knowing it, “and as the proverb runs: the poets utter many falsehoods. Nor ought we to hold any other science to be more honorable; for that which is most divine is the most honorable.” That which possesses and imparts the most excellent is honored; the gods are thus to be honored because they possess this science. “God is held to be the cause and principle of all; therefore God possesses this science alone, or in the most eminent degree.” But precisely on this account it is not unworthy of man to desire to attain this highest good of which he is capable, this God-pertaining science. “Other sciences may be more necessary than Philosophy, but none is more excellent.”

The details of the Aristotelian Philosophy, the general idea with its particular divisions,—to give these is difficult; for Aristotle is far more difficult to understand than Plato. The latter has myths, and one may omit the dialectical portion and still say that he has read Plato; but Aristotle always moves in the speculative. But he seems always to be philosophizing only on the individual, the special, and not to arrive at what is absolute, universal, or God; he goes on from particular to particular. His daily work is to consider what *is*, and he goes at his task as a professor does to his work laid out for the semester; and as he takes his readers through the whole mass of the world of conceptions, he gives the impression that he knew Truth only as existing in the particular—only as a series of special truths. This has noth-

ing brilliant in it, since he seems not to have elevated himself to the Idea (as Plato speaks of the "splendor of ideas"), nor to have reduced the individual to it. But if Aristotle has omitted to treat the universal Idea in a logical manner (for otherwise his so-called logic, which is something entirely different, would be recognized as an exposition of the method in which the one Idea appears in all), yet on the other hand the one Absolute, the Idea of God, appears in Aristotle's Philosophy, but as a particular somewhat, side by side with the others, notwithstanding it represents all truth. It is just as if one should say: "There are plants, animals, men, and besides these *God, the most excellent.*"

From the total series of ideas which Aristotle goes over, we will now select specimens in detail from the special provinces. *First*, I will speak of his Metaphysics and its characteristics; *secondly*, of the special sciences which Aristotle sketched, giving the fundamental idea of Nature as he defined it; *thirdly*, I will mention some things of spirit [Mind], and of the soul and its conditions; after this [*fourthly*], the logical treatises of Aristotle will form a conclusion to the whole.

## THE VENUS OF MILO.

Translated from the German of HERMAN GRIMM, by ALICE S. MILLARD.

Before me stands the mask of the Venus of Milo. After years, I look upon it daily, sometimes indifferently, sometimes with foreign thoughts, without knowing what I have before me, and suddenly it is there again as if I saw it for the first time, more beautiful than I ever beheld it. Whatever adorns and exalts a woman in our eyes is united for me in these lineaments. I think upon the reserved dignity of the Juno and find it repeated here; I think of the rejected tenderness of Psyche, and her tears appear to roll down these cheeks; I think of the captivating smiles of Aphrodite,—it plays around these lips.

What a curve to these lips! The upper one protruding gently in the middle, then receding on both sides, then again